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author outlines the history of progress from primitive magic and the magic spell to a spiritual worship more and more purified from the associations of the spell, recognizing however that lower and higher elements are able to coexist.

It is such studies as these which call forth the gratitude of all who are interested in the great problems of the origin and validity of our own religion.

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### HÖFFDING'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

Years ago in his *Kierkegaard als Philosoph*, and recently again in his article "Autobiographische u. Antikritische Bemerkungen über meine Religion und Philosophie," published in *Religion und Geistes Kultur*, Höffding describes his personal development in a way that helps us to a fuller appreciation of the book before us. For, as he says, an investigation of the religious problem, not only in its relation to science, but also in its relation to personal life, must of necessity be colored by the personality of the investigator. Always the personal element may be both help and hindrance to the clearness and thoroughness with which the problem should be treated. Which it has been in the case of Höffding he of course is, not in a position to decide, but he may help a little to a decision on the part of others by an autobiographic account of his personal and scientific development.

We learn then, that in his early years he was a student of theology, like Hegel, with a view to the Christian ministry. He admits that some of his critics are right in finding in this circumstance some explanation of his present attitude toward religious questions. While he is a free thinker, his free thinking is what it is partly because the effects of those early theological studies are still in his blood. Sharp as is the opposition between his present views and those in which his youth found nourishment, he yet thinks—and this is a conviction which points to the main characteristic of his entire philosophy and leads me to doubt Professor James's right to classify him as a pragmatist—that continuity in his development preponderates by far. Still, he thinks that he has found in another direction that inner satisfaction of his needs which impelled him to theology in the days of his youth. Nevertheless it is precisely from those days that he has preserved his sense of the importance of the inner life, and his feeling of the need of that life to find

<sup>1</sup> *The Philosophy of Religion*. By Harold Höffding, Professor in the University of Copenhagen. Translated from the German edition by B. E. Meyer. London: Macmillan, 1906. 410 pages.

expression for the strivings and sentiments of the heart in the struggle of existence—the need, that is, to see the worth and the fate of life expressed in great and impressive pictures and thoughts. As we read this book we see that it is just this symbolic expression of our human religiousness to which he has devoted such masterly descriptive and critical psychological examination. And it was this need, moreover, which gave to positive religion its power over him for so long and accounts for his reluctant and gradual surrender of that religion. The most painful experience of his inner life—as indeed it is of every such man—came when he saw that ecclesiastical Christianity could no longer satisfy that need, in consistency with the scientific and moral development of his maturer years.

It was Sören Kierkegaard who led him to doubt the validity of ecclesiastical Christianity. The first great change in the life of Höffding came when he discovered the self-deception of those who effected harmonization between the church and “modern Christianity,” on the one hand, and the “Christianity of the New Testament,” on the other—that is, between the life of the spirit according to the requirements of original Christianity and modern life in the family, in the state, in art, and in science. The effort of theology to bridge this gulf rests on a great misunderstanding. Of course, years of doubt and sorrow ensued—aggravated by anxiety with reference to a vocation which should possess essential significance for his personality. At length he broke with theology. Life itself led him forth from a dualism of the inner and outer life, by teaching him, through his own experience, the *worth of purely human relationships*. As Kierkegaard taught him to cast aside his theological books on account of their specious and artificial amalgamations of things incommensurable, so now he had to cast aside the books of Kierkegaard because their content was found to be incompatible with the realities which life itself had taught him. At the same time science became a reality to him as never before, and had to be accorded a place of its own in any serious calculation. From Greek thought, also, he learned *the possibility and the worth of free human relationships and conduct*. It was in life and in actual experience that he must find that satisfaction whose search has impelled him, first, to theology, then to the Kierkegaardian dualism. But the way was long, and Höffding does not seem to have had great faith that he could make much headway therein, for he soon encountered problems from which he has not even yet conquered release.

Doubting the ability of theology to satisfy either his religious or his scientific interest, under the influence of the philosophic criticism of theology by Kierkegaard, he gave himself to the study of the history, poetry, and philosophy of the Greeks, acquiring thus a conviction of the independ-

ent importance of science and of human life. Still hoping to maintain that he could find a true expression of the religious life in ecclesiastical dogma, he came to view religion and science as two thoroughly separate regions that could on that account co-exist. This was Kierkegaard's standpoint. It was partly the drastic criticism of this position by Professor Hans Bröckner, partly the more dogmatic stamp which Kierkegaard gradually gave to his own doctrine, which influenced Höffding to turn away from his past, to take up independent philosophic reflection, in search of unity and harmony of world-view, confident in the ability of the human spirit to attain thereunto.

It turns out that the poles between which Höffding's personal development moved were Kierkegaard's doctrine of personality (which is Kantian-Ritschlian) and the French-English positivism. To this must be added the influence of Spinoza who, after all, gave Höffding his central point of view, by virtue of which he must be classed as a (critical) monist, and not as a pragmatic pluralist. Personality, positivism, Spinozism—these are the constituents of that view of the world and of life in which Höffding has found such satisfaction for his own spirit, and of which he is such an eloquent apostle to others.

I have gained the conviction [he writes] that the highest and the noblest reality in the world of the spirit [personality] is subject to the laws of a great natural order, laws which it is the task of science to find [positivism], and that it is not limitation but gain for that which is most worthwhile to have its roots firmly in the great connection and system of things [Spinozism].

By brackets I have indicated the ingredients in this comprehensive statement of his philosophy. But the freedom and self-dependence of the individual without which there is no personality, conjoined with the deterministic phenomenalism to which all science strives to reduce all reality, and with the locked system of Spinoza—there is a problem in harmonistics before which that of primitive and modern Christianity which so agitated Höffding's youth pales into insignificance, and which the Kantian discrimination between "valuation" and "explanation," and the pragmatistic segregated absolutes of one's private creation to serve as tools in the workshop of one's own life, are solutions which but lend countenance to Höffding's contention that the problem is insoluble to thought. One must also sympathize with Höffding in the conviction that the farther one wanders in the world of thought, the greater and sharper the problems become.

Höffding's effort to write psychology and ethics on the basis of experience and in disregard of speculative and religious presuppositions profoundly affected his apprehension of the religious problem.

In this way I recognized more keenly the necessity of psychic equivalents, that is, the necessity of new forms of the spiritual life which would be substitutes for those that were disappearing, if life, in the course of its development, was not to lose its worth, perhaps even its energy.

This problem of psychic equivalents, he finds to have claimed the attention of all the outstanding philosophers now for more than a hundred years. And in his opinion:

The future of the problem depends upon the decision of the question as to whether (a) the *personal Lebensanschauung* can and ought to be built upon the results of science or whether, (b) in reflection concerning the worth of life, consideration must not be accorded to elements and tendencies which cannot be scientifically grounded but with which the results of science are not in conflict.

This is the key to his philosophy of religion. The position is, of course, Kantian.

His work consists of an (1) epistemological, (2) psychological, and (3) ethical investigation. By means of the *first* we learn that religion does not emerge from purely intellectual motives, and that religious ideas are not gained in a purely intellectual way, and that they cannot be established in such a way. If religious ideas are to have lasting worth, they must be pictorial expressions of life's experience which is of a special and personal character, rather than that experience upon which science builds. In the *second* section we are shown that the religious feeling receives its natural place in conscious life if it is considered as an effect of the experiences which are elaborated with reference to the relation between the worth of life and Reality or Existence. Thus, such feeling would abide, even were the day of positive religion past, nay, even if the word religion were to be given up. The religious stress has to do with the conservation or permanence of values.

In no other work on the philosophy of religion have we such an original and powerful discussion of this point—a point which is most vital to the whole problem. And yet it is precisely here, more than anywhere else in his book, that there are possibilities to which he either does no justice or which he neglects entirely. For example, what shall we think concerning the existence of non-human values? He assumes that extra-human existence is the home of static values. It is as if the golden egg that the goose lays were a ready-made entity, a possession of the goose apart from her own efficiency.

There are two alternatives: Cosmic values are *achieved* by the dynamic agencies structural to the cosmos, antecedent to and independent of all that is human; or, are arrived at in cosmic evolution only in and through the human.

Certainly, there is no more difficulty in conceiving the structure and function of the universe to be such as to *produce* either extra-human or human values than there is in the idea of dualistic supernaturalism on the one hand or that of increate static values on the other. Values, like golden eggs, are *grown*; certainly, *unachieved* values of a moral kind are a contradiction in terms, to the human way of experiencing. It would seem that even Thomas Aquinas had some glimpse of this matter when he was working so hard over the *aseity* of God.

In the *third* section the worth of religion itself is investigated—the worth consisting in its bearing upon the discovery of new, and its preservation of old values. Religion is, to be sure, no necessary presupposition of moral conduct. With reference to the idea that belief in immortality is such a presupposition, Höffding has these wise words to say:

Only he who has honestly and honorably labored for the values which can be found and produced in *this* world is prepared for a future world—if there be a future world, a question which experience alone can decide. . . . The more I have looked round on the world of thought and of reality, the more clearly it has been borne in upon me that those who are still ready to preach that were there no future life *this* life would lose all its value, take a great responsibility upon themselves (pp. 380, 381.)

The final result is that religion is a form of the life of the human spirit, which—if the power of that life is not to be weakened—may not vanish without our developing meantime a *new and equivalent form of life*.

The great question is whether this be possible.

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## TWO WORKS ON APOLOGETICS

This is the last work<sup>1</sup> from the pen of Professor Zöckler, who passed away while the volume was in press. He asserted in a letter to the publisher that it filled a distinct gap in theological literature, and the claim is well founded. We do not know any similar work that can compare with it in breadth and thoroughness of treatment. The author's aim is to present a concise yet complete history of Christian apology in all lands from the beginning of the second century down to the present time—i. e., to the year 1905. His method is to describe the general state of thought and the prevailing anti-Christian tendencies in every period, and then to exhibit the various ways in which the apologists of the age attempted to meet these tendencies.

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte der Apologie des Christentums*. Von Otto Zöckler. Nebst einem Verzeichnis der literarischen Veröffentlichungen des heimgegangenen Verfassers. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1907. xii + 747 pages. M. 12.